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           OUTLINE 
In this paper, the well-known convergence programs, implemented by the EU 
member-states, are closely evaluated. Using descriptive statistical analysis and the 
changes in the real exchange rates as analytical cornerstone, the paper focuses on 
the economic performance of the member-states since the accord (Dec. 1991) and 
the ratification (Febr. 1992) of the Maastricht Treaty. Changes in the trade balance, 
industrial production, rates of unemployment, inflation and interest rates (short-term 
and long-term) are used as criteria of success both in real and nominal terms. The 
statistical outcomes are compared with the ones found in similar research done by R. 
Gordon. The paper ends with the evaluation of the results and the policy lessons 
which can be drawn by the different exchange rate policies followed by the member-









 There has been much discussion in the literature on the issue of the 
European Economic and Monetary Unification. On the one side, there are 
authors who clearly emphasize the benefits stemming from the establishment 
of the common currency, paying attention mainly to the abolishment of 
transaction costs, the increase in trade and macroeconomic stability 
(European Economy 1990, Emerson et al. 1992, Gros and Thygesen 1992). 
The replacement of national notes and coins by the EURO at the threshold of 
the new century is said to benefit national economies by reducing uncertainty 
on interest and exchange rates, providing a better exchange for tourists and 
industry, diminishing red tape and bureaucracy created by banks, and 
establishing a strong and stable currency - guaranteed by the European 
Central Bank - which will allow better access to markets within and outside the 
EU for European enterprizes. It is believed by "pro-European" economists, 
politicians and policy-makers that in this way Europe will succeed, in the 
coming years, with high growth rates so as to reduce unemployment, poverty 
and social marginalisation around Europe.   
 On the other hand, sceptisism about the benefits of establishing the 
EURO as well as the way of constructing the new Europe in general, is mainly 
based on the theory of Optimum Currency Area (OCA) (Mundell 1961, 
McKinnon 1963, Kenen 1969).  The Maastricht Treaty is considered to be -at 
least- imperfect, if not mediocre, from many aspects. The mobility of the 
factors of production across Europe, namely labor and capital, have not 
increased and remain at low levels (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1992, 
Feldstein 1992, Pelagidis 1996a, 1996b). The European budget and in 
particular, the funds going to disadvantaged regions and poor countries are 
still less than the aid needed in order for economic activity and employment to 
be restored (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1994, Sala-i-Martin and Sachs 1991). 
In conclusion, it is argued that Europe does not fullfil the basic conditions to 
be an optimum currency area and the costs of establishing a common 
currency, namely output loss and high unemployment, are said to be too high 
to offset the benefits.  
 There are also authors who argue in favor of the establishment of the 
EURO, disagreeing with the way the EMU has been pursued up to now (De 
Grauwe 1995, 1996a, 1996b). Convergence criteria set by the Maastricht 
Treaty are considered to be responsible for high unemployment and economic 
stagnation around Europe which, in turn, have spread pessimism and 
disenchantment with the EMU among European citizens. 
 The purpose of this paper is not to argue for or against EMU, although 
in a previous paper (Pelagidis 1996a) we have clearly argued that the criteria 
of the OCA theory are not met in the European case and the prospects are 
not favorable. Specifically, attempts to meet the convergence criteria have 
worsened member-state's economic performance and the move towards 
monetary unification risks ending in failure.  
 This paper examines the economic results of the policies applied in the 
fifteen European countries, since the period 1991/92. The well-known 
convergence programmes implemented by national economies are closely 
evaluated. Using descriptive statistical analysis and the changes in the real 
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exchange rates as analytical cornerstone, the paper focuses on the economic 
performance of the member-states since the accord (Dec. 1991) and the 
ratification (Febr. 1992)  of the Maastricht Treaty. Changes in trade balance, 
industrial production, rates of unemployment and interest rates (short-term 
and long-term) are used as criteria of success both in real and nominal terms. 
The statistical outcomes are compared with the ones found in similar research 
done by R. Gordon (1996). 
 The paper ends with the evaluation of the results and the policy 
lessons which can be drawn by the -different exchange rate- policies followed 
by the EU member-states.       
 
 
2. Real convergence in Europe: What the evidence tells us 
 
 Although deflationary policies in general have been implemented 
throughout member-states since the early '90s, some countries appear to 
have followed different paths to meet the convergence criteria set by the 
Treaty of Maastricht. This policy differentiation refers mainly to the exchange 
rate policy and concerns European countries both outside and within EMS.  
 After five years implementing policy prescriptions, evaluation in 
professional journals as well as assessment by EU official authorities refer 
mainly to nominal convergence. The real economy, that is, output and 
employment, although of cardinal importance as a means of combating 
poverty and preserving social cohesion, were kept out of the evaluation. The 
persistant emphasis on the so-called nominal criteria and especially the 
concentration on policy tools for fighting inflation, has brought the highest 
levels of unemployment in Europe since the Depression, exacerbated social 
tensions and as a result, the achievement of further integration has been 
seriously threatened. 
 However, not all EU member-states have done so badly, even on the 
real economy front. Those which kept their currencies "hard" and their interest 
rates relatively high in the EMS context came out with high costs in terms of 
loss of industrial production, adverse trade balance and unemployment. This 
is not a surprise. Abandoning the exchange rate tool, while implementing at 
the same time contractionary fiscal and monetary policies in line with the 
Maastricht convergence criteria, the only way left to stabilize the economy is 
by deflationary policy. In other words, deflation took the place of currency 
devaluation, forcing the burden of adjustment mainly into the labor market 
(Dornbusch 1996). In the case of Europe, the burden of adjustment, under the 
previously circumstances falls mainly to poor regions/countries and to labor in 
particular.  
 Standard macroeconomics indicate that if exchange rates are pegged 
too tightly, internal and external imbalances are likely to emerge and can do 
far more damage to the countries involved in the -European monetary- system 
(Kenen 1994). Taking as a criterion the exchange rate policy followed by the 
member-states, we will examine bellow the performance of member-state's 
real economies, looking at the same time at the progress on real convergence 
after five years of implementing expenditure-reducing economic policies in the 
EU. Using descriptive statistical analysis, we will evaluate the cost of 
adjustment for each country separately. 
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 Economic performance according to industrial production and trade 
balances, interest rates (long-term and short-term) and unemployment will 
indicate wether we are going to have converging standards of living in Europe 
or, on the contrary, a "multi-speed Europe", which will establish different levels 
of prosperity within the EU.   
 
2.1 Exchange rates (Table 1) 
 
 The year 1992, marks a change in exchange rate policy of most of the 
member-states after the collapse of the ERM. Some of them left EMS and 
some others, while staying within the EMS, followed a much more flexible 
exchange rate policy. In Table 1 we observe that the cumulative (1991-95) 
real effective exchange rate change in Italy (-35.6), Sweden (-25.6),  Finland 
(-21.8), Spain (-18.5), Ireland (-15.6) and G. Britain (-12.8) was negative, 
which means that the currencies of the above countries depreciated (IMF 
World Economic Outlook 1996, p.140). Austria kept its currency almost stable 
vis-a-vis the other European currencies, although according to other sources 
(Eurostat & DGII 1996, p.61), real overvaluation of its currency reached 13%-
14%. The Portugese Escudo was also kept almost constant, while its slight 
cumulative overvaluation (+6.8) took place only in the year 1992, just before 
the collapse of the ERM. Finally the Belgian currency also remained constant.  
 On the contrary, the "hard" currency group includes mainly the 
countries of the European North. Real cumulatively (1991-95) revaluation is 
marked in Germany (+21%), Denmark (+8.9%), the Netherlands (+5.6%) and 
France (+4.9%), while with surprise we observe that Greece is included to this 
group of countries. Its currency was overvalued cumulatively (1991-95) 
+12.2%. High real overvaluation of a "weak" currency presupposes high 
interest rates in order for the currency to be efficiently supported. Official 
reserves in Greece reach about 20 bil. $ and, as we will see below, the greek 
interest rates are the highest in Europe. 
 Finally, in the case that a currency is highly overvaluated, according to 
standard macroeconomics, we should expect -to an extent- negative impacts 




     Table 1 
       Real effective exchange rate* 
        (Annual percentage change; 1991-1995) 
 
              1992             1993             1994          1995        1991-1995** 
D  3.3      7.9        2.3  7.5      21.0 
F  0.8      2.1           -  2.0    4.9 
UK     -             -6.5        0.8           -4.1              -9.8 
I                  -1.8         -17.5           -5.3         -11.0            -35.6  
E  0.8           -9.7             -8.0           -1.6            -18.5 
NL  2.7  2.8       -1.6  1.7     5.6 
B  1.0           -0.9       -0.4  1.8     1.5 
SW  1.0         -23.6       -1.7           -1.3             -25.6 
A  0.6          -0.2       -2.1  0.2        -1.5 
DK  1.8           3.1       -0.3  4.3     8.9 
FIN         -18.3            -16.0         3.3  9.2                  -21.8 
IRL           -2.0          -7.8        -4.2            -1.6             -15.6 
GR***           -2.5           2.6          5.6  6.5    12.2 
P***  6.0          -0.9         -0.1  1.8     6.8 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (1996), p.140 
*Doubled export weights; % change p.a.; on the basis of unit labor costs in the total economy 
**Cumulative percentage 
*** Eurostat & DGII (1996), p.61 
 
 
2.2 Interest Rates (Table 2) 
 
 Looking at Table 2 and taking as an "anchor" the German interest rate, 
we observe that the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Austria, Finland and 
France sustain a group of countries with interest rate differentiation less than 
1% from the German rate. All the above countries, with the possible 
exemption of Finland, belong to the so-called "hard currency" group.  
 On the contrary, Sweden (2.4), Ireland (5.3), Spain (4.0), Portugal 
(4.0), Italy (5.3) and G. Britain (5.3), that is the so-called "soft currency" 
countries, seem to keep their interest rates much higher than the "hard 
currency club", in order to manage -with the exemption of G. Britain- to keep 
their currencies within the ERM bands. The interest rate differentiation of 
Greece is around 10%, in order to efficiently support the artificially "hard" 
national currency. 
 According to the empirical evidence above, despite the fact that the 
"soft currency" countries followed a much more flexible exchange rate policy 
since 1991, nominal interest rates continue to be 2.4-5.3 percentage points 
higher than the German ones. This appears to be a precondition for the "soft 
currency" countries to preserve their currencies within the bands of the ERM.  
 The same outcomes can be also observed in Table 2 as far as it 
concerns the nominal long-term interest rates.  
 
     Table 2 
    Interest rates (July 1996) 
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  Nominal short-term          DGR*     Nominal long-term      DGR* 
D   3.3    -  5.9           -  
F   3.8   0.5  6.3                       0.4 
UK   8.6   5.3  8.3       2.4 
I   8.6   5.3  8.8       2.9 
E   7.3   4.0  8.1                        2.2 
NL   3.0            -0.3  6.7                        0.8 
B   3.3   0.0  6.8                        0.9 
SW   5.7   2.4  8.3        2.4 
A   3.5   0.2  6.5                        0.6 
DK   3.8   0.5  7.2                        1.3 
FIN   3.6   0.3  6.2                        0.3  
IRL   8.6   5.3  7.7                        1.8 
GR            14.0                       10.7          14.8 (May)              8.9 
P   7.3   4.0  7.2                        1.3 
* Difference from the German Rate (DGR) 
Source: Eurostat & DGII (1996) 
 
 
2.3 Industrial production (Table 3) 
 
 In Table 3 we can see that the member-states with appreciated 
national currencies; that is Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Portugal and Greece, experienced both cumulatively, and on average, very 
low growth rates of industrial production. In particular, Germany's average 
index is negative (-0.34) while the corresponding numbers for the rest of the 
"hard currency" countries are below 1%, with the exemption of the 
Netherlands at around 1%. 
 On the other hand, those member-states which followed a much more 
flexible exchange rate policy and left their currencies to fluctuate more freely 
than the others, such as Sweden, Finland, Italy and G.Britain -all outside the 
EMS- have an average growth rate of industrial production which ranges 
between +2.5% and +6.2%. Ireland, with its currency depreciating at around 
20% since 1991, did extremely well. Ireland's cumulatively industrial growth 




     Table 3 
   Industrial production 
  (1992-1996 cumulative percentage) 
 
         1992-96        1992-96 Average (yearly) 
D       -1.7             -0.34 
F   1.4    0.28 
UK           12.0    2.40 
I           12.4    2.48 
E   4.6    1.15 
NL   5.3    1.06 
B   2.1    0.42 
SW           21.6    4.32 
A   7.8    1.56 
DK           16.8    3.36 
FIN           30.9    6.18 
IRL           56.4            11.28 
GR   1.6    0.32   
P   2.0    0.40 
 
Source: OECD (1996), p.A14 and own calculations 
 
 
2.4 Trade balance (Table 4)  
 
 In the two columns of Table 4, we see once again that most of the 
countries which implemented a flexible exchange rate policy either by staying 
outside EMS -or inside but taking advantage of the wide band of +/-15- 
improved their competitive position in the markets. Together with the better 
performance of these member-states as far as industrial production is 
concerned, trade balance also improved. Italy reversed its trade deficit to a 
trade surplus of 2.8% as a % of GDP; Sweden and Finland doubled their 
trade surplus, while Ireland saw its surplus to increase from 11.7% to 18.1% 
(as a % of GDP). 
 Spain, G. Britain and Austria decreased their trade deficit, while, on the 
contrary Greece's deteriorating trade deficit fits very well with the highly 
overvalued national currency which worsens the poor industrial base of the 




    Table 4 
      Trade balance as a % of GDP 
 
            1992           1996 
D     1.4   3.1 
F            -0.3   0.6 
UK            -2.8  -1.6 
I            -0.8   2.8 
E            -5.9  -4.2 
NL    2.3   3.9 
B            -2.1  -1.0 
SW    2.3   6.0 
A            -5.0  -3.0 
DK    4.6   3.2 
FIN    2.6   6.7 
IRL            11.7            18.1 
GR               -13.9           -14.9 
P                   -13.2      -9.9 
Source: Eurostat & DGII (1996) 
 
2.5 Unemployment (Table 5) 
 
 As far as unemployment is concerned, G. Britain (-1.7) and Ireland (-
4.0) depreciated their currencies and reduced their rates of unemployment 
despite Europe's economic stagnation. On the contrary, member-states in 
continental Europe, with the exemption of Denmark (-2.8%), saw their 
unemployment rate deteriorate. Expenditure-reducing policies along with 
"hard currency policies" increased the unemployment rate, worsening the 
prospects for further economic and monetary unification in Europe.  
  
     Table 5 
   Extra Unemployment (1996 minus 1992) 
  D   2.6 
  F   1.3 
  UK             -1.7 
  I   2.9 
  E   4.0 
  NL   1.6 
  B   2.8 
  SW   3.0 
  A   0.7 
  DK             -2.8 
  FIN   3.2 
  IRL             -4.0 
  GR   1.2 
  P   3.3 
Source: Eurostat & DGII (1996) 
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 According to the above evidence, it is suggested that the member-
states with flexible exchange rate policy, either inside or outside the EMS, 
witnessed the best results as far as the "real economy" is concerned. This 
implies that a better policy prescription for the rest of the member-states could 
have improved economic performance around Europe, reducing poverty and 
increasing employment and output. In other words, convergence criteria 
appear to have caused divergence in the real economies, causing higher 
rates of unemployment and economic stagnation and spreading, at the same 
time, social unrest and discontent within the E.U.  
 However, enthousiastic supporters of the EMU, point out that deflation 
is the only way to bring down inflation and create the appropriate conditions 
for growth. According to the -well known- "credibility" economic doctrine 
(Persson and Tabellini 1996),  fixed exchange rates and expenditure-reducing 
policies are needed for the road to EURO in order for member-states to take 
advantage of "credibility" in the markets, to attract foreign capital and spur 
growth.  
 Despite the teachings of the "credibility" school, low inflation in Europe 
has neither caused higher growth rates nor increased employment.  However, 
most national governments and Central Banks keep implementing 
deflationary policies all around Europe. At the Dublin Intergovernmental 
conference indeed, additional decisions were taken to restrict further budget 
deficits and to punish the member-states of the EURO zone which do not 
obey the rules. Taking into account that exchange rates will be irrevocably 
locked after 1/1/1999, the burden of adjustment is expect to fall exclusively to 
the labor market (Dornbusch 1996, Kapstein 1996), which means further loss 
of output, even higher rates of unemployment and low GDP growth.  
 In this context, it is of upmost importance to examine the effectiveness 
of the deflationary policies implied in the EU member-states, looking at their 




3. "Sacrifice ratio" 
  
 The cost of economic policies implied under the Maastricht 
convergence programmes to the EU member-states, can also be evaluated 
by using the "sacrifice ratio", that is by using the ratio of cumulative 
unemployment above the 1990 level divided by the disinflation between 1990-
96, using the consumer price inflation index. 
 According to the data concerning inflation and unemployment rates,  
we estimate the sacrifice ratio for Europe as a whole to be 1.45 for 1990-96, 
while during this period, unemployment increased 3.2%  and inflation went 
down by only 2.2% (Eurostat & DGII 1996). 
 On the contrary, as seen in the Table 6, the sacrifice ratio for the same 
period is much lower in non-EU countries such as the USA, Canada, Norway 
etc. It can also be observed in the following table that EU member-states such 
as Italy and G. Britain which left the EMS in 1992 have done better than the 
countries participating in the ERM of the EMS. 
 
     Table 6 
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         Sacrifice ratio (cumulative average)* 
 
            1990-1996       1992-1996  
Non EMS members 
USA     -0.03            -10.00 
Canada     0.42             -4.00 
Australia     0.47                 0.83 
Norway    -0.47                     -16.00 
G. Britain         0.30               -2.00 
Italy         1.50                 2.70 
N. Zealand          -0.33                     -13.66 
 
EMS members 
Germany               0.81 
France               2.16 
Spain                 1.42 
Netherlands               1.33 
Belgium             28.00 
Sweden             15.00 
Austria               0.38 
Denmark            -14.00 
Finland     1.33 
Ireland            -20.00 
 
* The sign plus (+) means a positive sacrifice ratio. The highest the ratio the highest the cost -
in terms of unemployment- of bringing down inflation. On the contrary, the sign minus (-) 
means that deflation was followed by a deceleration of the unemployment rate. 
Source: OECD (1996); Own calculations 
For the year 1996: European Economy (1996) and IMF World Economic Outlook (1996); Own 
calculations 
 
 Looking closely at the outcomes of the sacrifice ratio calculations, we 
see that all countries participating in the EMS brought down inflation with 
higher cost in terms of unemployment and in terms of production output than 
most of the OECD countries. Participation in the EMS appears not to be an 
advantage for reducing inflation in the '90s, a fact that already has been 
mentioned by Dornbusch (1989) and Collins (1988) for the decade of the '80s 
(1981-1988). Collins examining the period 1979-1986 and, concentrating on 
France, shows that the regulations as well as the narrow bands that EMS 
imposed on the French franc had no favorable effects on the long-term 
exchange rate stability of the national currency as well as on inflation. 
Dornbusch (1989) argues that if it is true that the ERM provides its members 
with "credibility", then we would expect a lower sacrifice ratio for these 
countries in the '80s, that is, lower inflation with a lower comparatively 
increase in unemployment. This neither happened in the '80s, nor, as proved 
by empirical evidence presented in this paper, in the '90s. On the contrary, 
countries remaining outside the EMS brought down inflation either without any 




 There is another important implication of the analysis above. Despite 
the fact that countries outside EMS, especially after its collapse in 1992,  
“unlocked” their currencies from the EMS narrow bands and depreciated their 
currency, this policy did not lead to an inflationary resurgence. On the 
contrary, the slow down of the growth of the inflation rate was even faster for 
the "EMS outsiders" than the reduction of inflation for the "EMS insiders". 
Sweden, Finland, Italy and G. Britain, while they remained outside the EMS 
during 1992-1996, secured a faster deceleration of inflation than the average 
EU inflation deceleration.  
 In conclusion the evidence presented does not credit those authors 
arguing that any currency depreciation leads to higher inflation. In Friedman's 
(1953) words, "...a fear of inflation has little or no chance of producing 
inflation, except in a favorable monetary environment". "Credibility" given by 
the EMS does not appear to help "insiders" to either achieve lower sacrifice 
ratio or even to reduce inflation rates, faster than the "outsiders". Thus, better 
economic performance seems to depend on implementing the appropriate 
policy-mix and not, as the "credibility" paradigm implies, on the establishment 
of independent authorities -such as the Central Banks- of rigid policy "rules" 
based on "inflation targeting" and on narrow exchange rate bands. An 
economic policy mix is considered successful and "credible" when it restores 
internal and external balance, that is, when it brings down inflation, preserves 
full employment and keeps an equilibrium in external balance. A "credible" 
economic policy does not mean fighting inflation at any cost. 
 On the same principle, Gordon (1996) argues that those member-
states which withdrew their currency from the EMS after 1992 (Italy and G. 
Britain), or others, while remaining insiders, who depreciated their currencies 
(Spain, Portugal, Sweden), experienced a reduction in inflation rate which was 
0.4% faster than the inflationary reduction in countries that implemented strict 
deflationary policies. In addition, they witnessed a nominal growth rate 1.3% 
(1.7% in real terms) higher than countries which saw their currencies 
appreciate. It should be mentioned that in his research, Gordon (1996) 
includes in "appreciating countries" only Austria, Belgium, France, the 




     Table 7 
Change in Effective Exchange Rates and Growth Rates of Nominal GDP and 
GDP deflator, 1992-95. Five appreciating and five depreciating countries 
 
         Appreciating* Depreciating** DDA***       
Effective Nominal Exchange 10.2  -22.2    -32.2 
Rate (1995-1992) 
% change in Nominal GDP 
(1995-92)      0.4     1.7        1.3 
% change in Real GDP 
1995-92      1.0     2.7                   1.7 
% change in GDP Deflator 
1995-92     -0.6               -1.0                  -0.4 
 
*Appreciating countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Switzerland 
**Depreciating countries: Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
***Difference Depreciating minus Appreciating 
Source: Gordon (1996), table 2 
 
 Similarly,  Helpman, Leiderman and Bufman (1994), examining 
exchange rate policies and inflation in Chile, Israel and Mexico, have 
observed that in Chile, where the national currency depreciated, inflation was 
brought down, and indeed that the possibility of expected devaluation was 
very low. On the contrary, in Israel and Mexico, due to currency appreciation, 
the possibility of a sudden devaluation proved to be much more likely. 
 
 Besides better performance in inflation rates and GDP, the outside 
EMS countries appeared to have done better in both reducing budget deficits 
and, more importantly, in reducing the actual (a) minus structural (s) deficit, as 




     Table 8 
Comparison of actual (a) and structural* (s) budget deficit/surplus as a % of 
GDP  
 
   1993    1996 
Italy      (a)  -9.6    -7.8 
   (s)  -8.7    -7.5 
 (a-s)  -0.9    -0.3 
G. Brit. (a)  -7.7    -3.2 
   (s)  -5.0    -2.0 
 (a-s)  -2.7    -1.2 
Finland(a)  -7.1    -3.3 
  (s)  -3.4    -2.6 
 (a-s)  -3.7    -0.7 
Ireland  (a)  -2.4    -2.0 
   (s)  -2.3    -2.5 
 (a-s)  -0.1              +0.5 
Spain    (a)  -7.5    -5.2 
   (s)  -5.5    -3.5 
 (a-s)  -2.0    -1.7 
Sweden (a)           -13.5         -9.7 
   (s)  -9.9    -8.4 
 (a-s)  -3.6    -1.3 
 
Source: Giorno et al. (1995) and own calculations 
*The structural deficit/surplus is estimated as a % of potential output 
 
 The accomodating monetary policy, together with currency 
depreciation policy, which the countries of the above table implemented, 
reduced the part of the budget deficit created by the economic stagnation. If 
this  policy would have been applied all over the EU, combined also with 
proper structural policies, the "natural rate" of unemployment, that is, the rate 
that would be determined by the private sector in the absence of monetary 
disturbances, could have been much lower in Europe. In G. Britain and in 
Ireland between 1992-1996 we had a reduction in unemployment  of -1.7% 
and -4.0% correspondingly. The fact that, as seen, the inflation rate in these 
countries had also been reduced, proves that there is enough margin for 
further reduction of the rate of unemployment without the danger of inflation. 
 Thus, a new policy mix based on some coordinated monetary 
expansion (Modigliani 1996) and exchange rate flexibility in Europe appears 
that it could pull down both the actual and natural rates of unemployment, 
increase rates of growth and reduce budget deficits without politically difficult 
budget-cutting. Demand expansion, by creating jobs may also reduce the 








 In this paper, we have examined aspects of real economic divergence 
among EU member-states. Deflationary policies across Europe spread by the 
implementation of convergence programmes in most of the member-states 
appear to have created serious problems in real economic performance. 
Exchange rate fixity in the context of the ERM seemed to be the main factor 
which determined interest rates and as a result, industrial production, trade 
performance and unemployment. 
 Through descriptive statistics, we observed that there is a trade-off 
between exchange rate fixity and economic performance in the real economy. 
Countries which depreciated their currencies, either inside or outside the 
EMS, did better in the growth rate of industrial production, increased trade 
surplus or reduced deficit and decreased unemployment. On the contrary, 
countries that appreciated their currencies, having either a "hard currency" 
(eg. Germany) or a "weak currency" (eg. Greece), witnessed a deterioration of 
the above performance criteria. 
 Suprisingly, according to the evidence presented, depreciating 
countries also did better in decelarating inflation. This is not actually a 
heretical view. Collins (1988), Dornbusch (1989), Helpman, Leiderman and 
Bufman (1994), have also argued that inflation has, in many cases in the past, 
decelerated along with coincidental currency depreciation. 
 The "sacrifice ratio" was also lower for depreciating countries. Inflation 
was brought down with less cost in terms of unemployment than in the 
appreciating countries. Also, Gordon's research has shown that depreciating 
countries in Europe have increased GDP more than the countries which 
implemented a "hard currency" policy. 
 Finally, depreciating countries seemed to have done better in both 
reducing budget deficits and, more important, reducing the difference “actual-  
structural deficit. 
 
 It is not the purpose of this paper to propose a new policy agenda. 
However, in the present conditions of 18.5 million unemployed Europeans and 
50 million in poverty, it is certain that Europe needs a change in the policy mix 
implemented up to now. The ERM as applied, has proved to be a regime of 
permanent deflation and mass unemployment. The effort of countries with 
"weak currencies" to cut budget deficits, keeping at the same time their 
exchange rate artificially high, has been pursued through reducing demand, 
that is, by applying expenditure-reducing policies and by keeping interest 
rates at high levels in order to attract foreign capital and finance external 
deficits. With all member-states trying to become more competitive  by cutting 
demand, increasing taxes and reducing public expenditures (competitive 
disinflation), the net result is economic stagnation and high unemployment 
(Toporowski 1995). As a consequense, further -European- unification, 
member-state's cooperation and social peace are seriously threatened. Why 
not then start  with a coordinated stimulus program right now, before Europe 
falls victim to "economic orthodoxy" beloved of central bankers (Soros 1996)?  
 This programme should include the implementation of expenditure-
switching policies across Europe focusing on public investments and the 
possibility of national governments, confronting internal and external 
instabilities, to use the highly important - as proved by this paper- exchange 
rate policy instrument in order to stabilize their economy. In this way, 
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employment  will increase, poverty will be reduced and social cohesion will be 
strengthened. Otherwise, if Brussels leaves economic policy to “central 
bankers”, the pursuing of common currency through austerity and mass 
unemployment will continue, facing the risk of the EURO project ending in 
failure. The common currency is originally a good idea but only in a regime of 
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